Empire Rising: Spain

The number of state representatives is 56. Each of the 14 administrative regions at the state level in Spain has 4 seats in the Upper House, perfectly splitting these 56 seats.

The proportion of noble members reflects Carlo’s control over the Upper House. It’s no exaggeration to say that any of Carlo’s ideas can be voted through in the Upper House, which is also the trump card Carlo leaves for himself.

Don’t underestimate the Lower House, which holds great power. It can elect the Prime Minister, the highest leader of the government, enact laws, supervise the government, and more.

But in reality, the powers of the Upper House are no less than those of the Lower House, and even surpass them.

The Upper House oversees the Party Review Committee, which can directly declare any political party in Spain legitimate or illegitimate. This means that the Upper House holds the power of life and death over all political parties in Spain, and since the majority of Spanish members are affiliated with parties, the influence of the Upper House is evident.

In addition, the Upper House also controls powerful departments such as the Performance Evaluation Review Bureau and the Election Oversight Committee.

The Performance Evaluation Review Bureau, needless to say, can conduct performance evaluations on all officials in Spain and review their original performance.

As long as one is in Spanish politics, everyone is subject to the control of the Performance Evaluation Review Bureau of the Upper House, and their career prospects and destiny are in the hands of the Upper House.

The Election Oversight Committee, as its name suggests, was specially established by the Upper House to oversee everything from the Prime Minister’s election to governors and mayors’ elections in various states and cities.

All elections are subject to the supervision of the Election Oversight Committee. If the Election Committee determines an election is illegal, even a candidate for Prime Minister approved by a majority of the Lower House loses their legitimacy.

These three important institutions are Carlo’s trump cards in future confrontations with the Spanish Prime Minister. With these three important institutions, even if a Prime Minister holds significant power and does not support the monarchy, Carlo need not worry about his position being threatened.

Moreover, with the Upper House’s legislative review authority, it can veto bills passed by the Lower House, effectively curbing the Lower House. Thus, Carlo can exert his influence over all of Spain’s parliamentary institutions.

For this reason, when the recommended election system of the Lower House was submitted to the Upper House, the voting was swift, passing the bill in a very short time.

With the implementation of the recommended election system, it became more difficult for state governors to secure re-election.

Although they can automatically become candidates for governorship, if their performance does not meet the standard, they may lose their candidacy by parliamentary decision.

Additionally, since both Houses recommend another candidate, the elections for state governors and city mayors become a three-way competition.

Even if a governor has a decent track record, other candidates with the support of either House have a significant advantage.

Of course, the recommended election system is not entirely disadvantageous.

As long as governors can establish solid performance records, they can more easily attract the attention of Parliament and the Cabinet Government. Thus, governors have a chance to be appointed by the Prime Minister as Cabinet Ministers after their terms end.

After all, the requirements for becoming a Cabinet Minister are not very high. Once appointed, they automatically secure a seat in the Lower House as members.

Following the administrative restructuring, the promotion path for state governors has expanded, simultaneously strengthening the control of the Cabinet Government and Parliament over the state governments.

Although it’s not a direct official appointment and removal system, given the current situation in Spain, Carlo can still manage direct appointments and removals of state officials.

The greatest advantage of this approach is avoiding officials with limited capability from staying in their positions too long.

Carlo treats all Spanish officials equally. Anyone with ability, regardless of noble lineage, has the opportunity to become a high official in Spain.

But those without ability should abdicate early and make way for others. Important positions like state governor must be filled by capable officials.

A local executive is crucial for regional development, potentially leading a poor area to prosperity or reducing a once-thriving region to poverty.

With strengthened control by the Cabinet Government and Parliament over the state governments, performance evaluations of officials become critically important.

Beyond Parliament’s interest in state governors, the most attentive party is probably the Performance Evaluation Review Bureau.

Annual performance evaluations become paramount for officials, possibly determining whether their political careers can continue in the coming years.

A governor with excellent performance evaluations can run for office again, or be promoted to Cabinet Minister or other key departments.

In contrast, poor evaluations make even continued re-election unlikely, let alone promotion to the Cabinet Government or other key departments.

If the Spanish press covers the Performance Evaluation Review Bureau’s assessments, it could signal the end of an official’s political career.

Once the public is aware that an official has received poor evaluations, they will no longer support him.

Without public support, re-election becomes impossible. Although the public cannot directly influence official elections, they can elect their preferred, trusted members of Parliament.

To maintain public support, members of Parliament must consider public opinion. Supporting or opposing candidates unpopular with the public would erode their trust.

The increased authority of the Performance Evaluation Review Bureau is good news for Carlo, as it enhances his influence over public affairs.

Since the political restructuring, signs have shown of this change. Originally, as the King of Spain, Carlo’s control over regional governments was limited.

Carlo’s influence was notably higher in Spanish colonies, where Governors of the Colony were personally appointable by the King.

Although he couldn’t whimsically appoint and remove Governors of the Colony, Carlo had significant influence over their selection.

This allowed Carlo to maintain strong control over Spanish colonies. Previously, when he wanted to train candidates he favored, he would send them to a colony as Governor, then bring them back to Spain to elevate their positions.

Now, as Carlo’s control over Spanish state governments increases, he can nurture his preferred officials domestically.

Madrid and Barcelona, as special cities, serve as key locales for breeding notable candidates in Carlo’s plans.

Carlo intends for all promising officials to serve as mayors in these special cities for some period.

If they achieve outstanding performance, Carlo will consider promoting them to the Cabinet or other important departments.

If they fail to accomplish anything as mayors in these special cities, it’s clear such officials lack significant capability.

Despite their smaller population and area, these two cities, as the most crucial in Spain, receive substantial political resource allocation.

With this political boon, those with some ability can leverage it to success.

Inability to do so indicates inadequate capability; surely, development can’t fully rely on Cabinet Government support?

If government support is solely relied upon, what is the need for state governors and city mayors?