Re: Blood and Iron

History was filled with simplistic tactics during a time of war that, when observing with a rational mind one might not believe had any chance of possibly succeeding. And if one were purely logical and rational this would indeed be the result 100/100 times.

But most of the time a plan that was perfectly conceived, and perfectly thought through failed not because there was faulty logic within the plot itself. But because of the execution of said scheme.

Why was execution usually the failing point? Because unlike everything else involved, whether that be the logistics, strategy, or tactics prepared in advance, it was ultimately the execution that was prone to the most severe and often overlooked critical mistake.

Human error. Those two words, when combined together in sequence described something that could even further be simplified by the term stupidity. In this world, as a human, you were forced to interact with other people, whether directly or indirectly.

Nothing existed in a vacuum with you alone. And because other people existed, and were prone to being stupid, one would need to factor this into their plans if they wanted to guarantee success. Why do I mention human stupidity? Well, because certain tactics on the battlefield that proved successful time and time again would never be achieved without that very thing.

For example, the feigned retreat, a tactic which the Mongols almost exclusively used on the field to obtain victory had only worked because every time they attempted it their enemies chose to pursue them, rather than simply stand still in their fortified position.

It was very simple not to fall prey to the "feigned retreat." When the enemy breaks ranks and flees, do not pursue them, rather fortify your own position so that you are in a better position for their next attack.

War was a long and drawn-out affair. Seldom in history was an army capable of obliterating another army to the last man. That is why it was an accomplishment that was usually awarded with the most exceptional of decorations or other forms of prizes.

Likewise, the double envelopment was another such strategy. If one simply was aware of their surroundings as they should be at all times, and advanced at a reasonably paced, in line with their own reinforcements, then it was impossible to fall prey to its devastating effects. And that is ultimately the crux of this essay.

Paul von Hindenburg’s grand strategy to annihilate the allies in Luxembourg relied upon nobody within the chain of command proposing the idea that maybe, just maybe it was a bad idea to advance into an area where they could easily be surrounded and fired upon from all sides by an army of equal if not greater size. And one that was technologically superior at that.